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“Are we in South Africa or in the Congo here?”, Alistair asked himself after
working for a few months in a global mining company.1 We were sitting on the
terrace of his house on a Sunday afternoon, and he was telling me about his
experience as a Congolese Human Resources (HR) manager in this company.
Although he held a senior management position, he was being confronted by
informal racial segregation practices in the workers’ camp where he lived for
three weeks each month. At work, his South African supervisor retained all the
powers and privileges, yet it was Alistair who was under pressure from all sides to
hire workers. During our conversation, he received two phone calls, one from a
member of the national parliament, and another from an army general, both
offering up candidates who could be suitable for a job in his company. Alistair
was also put in the position of defending his employers’ interests before the unions,
and justifying mass layoffs to political authorities. Last but not least, he was the
person the workers held responsible for the company’s decisions. He often worried
about his safety and it seems that his fears were founded: When I met one of his
friends a month later, he told me that Alistair had fled to Zambia with his family.
After the company announced a restructuring plan, he had received an anonymous
threatening letter.1,2,3,4
The contradictions Alistair confronted at work have their roots in the liberal-
ization of the Congolese copper mining sector and the boom in foreign investments
that followed in the 2000s. Throughout the 20th century, this sector was dominat-
ed by a single enterprise – the Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga (UMHK), renamed
Generale des Carrieres et des Mines (Gecamines) after its nationalization in the late
1960s (Dibwe Dia Mwembu, 2001; xx, 2013). The company built infrastructures
and developed social programmes that allowed it to take charge of all aspects of its
workers’ lives. Following its decline in the 1990s, the state-owned enterprise began
to seek foreign partners to operate its mines and plants. Stimulated by the generous
tax conditions offered by the mining code promulgated in 2002 and the rise of
copper and cobalt prices from 2004 onwards, investors of various sizes and origins
came to explore the opportunities available to them in the Congolese copperbelt,
and start new mining and industrial projects – most of them in joint venture with
Gecamines. A dozen projects are currently in the production phase. In several
respects, the labour practices put in place in these projects break with those
upheld by Gecamines in the past: the new companies hire fewer workers, grant
less benefits, and do not hesitate to terminate contracts for economic reasons (xx,
2019). It is against this background that the difficulties Alistair encountered in his
job as a HR manager must be understood, as he has come to represent a foreign
company that seeks to drastically cut labour costs in a region profoundly marked
by the legacy of Gecamines’ industrial paternalism.
This article aims to analyze in more detail the role of HR managers working for
the transnational companies that have developed new mining projects in the cop-
perbelt over the past two decades. Middle managers working for transnational
companies in the global South are seldom taken as an object of investigation in
the social sciences. In the study of mining companies, classical ethnographies
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focused on the consciousness of unskilled workers (Finn, 1998; Gordon, 1977;
Moodie and Ndatshe, 1994; Nash,1993[1979]); only recently have researchers
started paying attention to the practices of expatriate executives (Rajak, 2011;
Welker, 2014). Yet national middle managers often play a key role in the imple-
mentation of strategic changes locally and the localization of foreign companies
(Golub and Rhee, 2013). Studying their role can therefore contribute to a better
understanding of the development of mining capitalism in the global South.
There are now a number of qualitative studies on middle managers (Dalton,
1959; Hassard et al., 2007, 2009; Ho, 2009; Jackall, 1988; Kunda, 1992; Watson,
1994). Most of them, however, are based on research in long-established compa-
nies of the global North (especially the US, UK, and Japan) and their main focus is
on power relations in the organization, the promotion of corporate culture, and
the experience of middle managers confronted to restructuring processes.
Although this body of literature provides insights on the internal workings of
corporations, including mining corporations (see xx, 2020), it does not allow to
capture the specifics of the work performed by middle managers employed by
recently established foreign companies in the global South – how they get their
job and access their position; how they obtain and maintain expatriate executives’
trust; and how they participate in the implementation of corporate policies at the
local level.
To study the work of these middle managers, this article proposes to draw
inspiration from the social science literature on brokers and brokerage. Brokers
are broadly defined in this literature as intermediaries who draw material, political,
and symbolic profits from mediating the access to resources they do not control –
in contrast to patrons, who directly control the resources that are redistributed in
the community (Lindquist, 2015: 870; see Blok, 1969; Boissevain, 1974; Mayer,
1967). Their work of mediation is generally understood as being at the same time
delicate – brokers must deal with conflicting expectations – and profitable –
brokers can influence the course of events to their own advantage. While doing
so, it also contributes to reconfigure power structures locally – brokers are key
agents of social change (Bailey, 1963).
There are however different types of brokerage, and these variations deserve
more attention from social scientists (Stovel and Shaw, 2012; Swidler and Watkins,
2017). In line with classical studies in the anthropology of brokers, recent ethno-
graphic studies continue to focus on the role of local power figures in projects
implemented by external organizations in rural areas (Bierschenk et al., 2000;
James, 2011; Mosse and Lewis, 2006). The literature on new mining projects is
no exception to this tradition (e.g. Cuvelier and Geenen, 2019; Manson and
Mbenga, 2003; Negi, 2010). This bias in favor of local brokers inadvertently
leads to neglect the way in which mining projects are negotiated by different cat-
egories of actors within foreign companies: these companies continue to be repre-
sented in most of these studies as corporate persons with their own will (see, for a
critique of this view, Ballard and Banks, 2003; Golub, 2014; Welker, 2014). If the
anthropological literature on brokerage allows to break with the romantic image
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of the isolated, consensual, village community, it does not really challenge, on the
other hand, the monolithic image of the mining corporation as a profit-oriented
machine.
To balance this asymmetry, this article proposes to show the relevance of the
anthropological literature on brokerage for studying the role of middle managers
in transnational mining companies who work at the interface with local stake-
holders. Mining projects bring many resources locally – taxes, markets, jobs,
gifts, social investments, and so on –whose allocation is generally managed by
various professionals. The number of these professionals depends on the size of
mining projects. While in small projects, or in large projects in the development
phase, all the administrative and social functions (personnel management, public
relations, legal affairs, community development, etc.) are often performed by the
same Congolese manager, in larger projects, they are divided among different
departments, services, and professionals. In any case, these middle managers can
be viewed as company brokers, who facilitate the establishment of projects in the
local political arena and draw various personal benefits from this work of medi-
ation.2 In doing so, this paper argues, they contribute to shape mining capitalism
at the local level.
In the following sections, I will focus on three specific dimensions of the bro-
kerage work carried out by HR managers in the Congolese mining sector: the skills
that they must develop to perform this work, their struggle for gaining expatriate
executives’ trust, and their role in the changes that new mining investors have
brought in the domain of labour. The data used for this analysis was collected
during ethnographic fieldwork carried out between 2016 and 2018 within the
framework of the [details about the research project and the funding body xx].
During this period, I completed a one-month internship in a mining company’s
HR department and conducted more than one hundred interviews with various
actors involved in the regulation of work in the Congolese mining sector. Below I
principally use the long, repeated, conversations that I had with HR managers in
the mining sector.
Skills
To act as intermediaries between external organizations and local communities,
brokers must master different linguistic and cultural codes, and be able to change
from one to the other according to circumstances (Cohen and Comaroff, 1976;
Geertz, 1960; James, 2011). To bring to light the brokerage work carried out by
HR managers therefore implies to begin by studying the various skills that they put
to use, and analyzing how they developed these skills during their careers
(Bierschenk et al., 2000).
The HR managers working for foreign mining companies in the Congolese
copperbelt have common social characteristics. First, they are Congolese nation-
als, as the position of personnel manager being on the list of occupations foreigners
are forbidden by law from holding. Second, they have a higher education degree
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from a Congolese or foreign institution. And third, they are predominantly men. I
could find only one exception to the latter, a woman who had been appointed by
Gecamines as HR manager in a joint venture project with a Chinese state-owned
enterprise, who, unfortunately, refused to meet with me. According to my inform-
ants, if most HR managers are men, this is above all because this job requires to
have authority over the workers, who are predominantly men. Men, they explained
to me, are more prepared to exercise such authority and are also ascribed more
legitimacy for such authority in the eyes of workers. Independent of these common
characteristics, three typical careers, or modes of access to the position of HR
manager, can be distinguished.
The oldest HR managers worked for Gecamines before being appointed to a
new mining project. Most mining projects in the Congolese copperbelt are based
on joint venture agreements, which provide that appointments to certain manage-
rial positions are the prerogative of the Congolese state-owned enterprise.
Generally, Gecamines management identifies a candidate from its senior managers
who are close to the end of their career, and are hired with a new contract by the
joint venture project. Since the new position comes with a raise, most managers
accept the job offer with enthusiasm. In their view, it is a kind of golden parachute,
that allows to save some money before retirement. A small number of HR man-
agers were recruited by the mining company shortly after graduating from univer-
sity, and progressively rose to the position of HR manager in the organization. The
last category of HR managers is distinct from the previous one insofar as they have
worked for several multinational companies before being recruited for the job they
currently hold. From position to position, and company to company, they
improved their English, developed relationships with some expatriate executives,
and raised their profile on the labour market.
Whether they studied in the Congo or abroad, none of my informants had been
trained as a HR manager. Having obtained their degree in law, economics, soci-
ology, or another subject, they acquired their professional HR skills on the job.
These include organizational skills (mastering the rules and procedures for recruit-
ment, the calculation of wages, disciplinary actions, dismissals, etc.); legal skills
(knowing the labour law sufficiently to negotiate with unions, to prevent penalties
from labour inspectors, and to avoid workers taking legal action against the com-
pany in case of mass layoff); and, in some cases, strategic skills (some HR man-
agers are invited to actively participate in the implementation of organizational
development plans designed by the joint venture majority partner’s HR team at the
headquarters). Independently of these professional skills, HR managers must of
course develop various linguistic, social, and cultural skills in order to tactfully
manage the contradictory interests of executives, union representatives, workers,
and local state authorities.
While my informants learned the foundations of their trade on the job, they also
had the opportunity to participate in training courses in the Congo or abroad.
Some companies offer HR managers accelerated training courses in a neighboring
country. Additionally, the national employers’ association regularly organizes
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courses on various HR rules and procedures in Lubumbashi. These are taught by
Congolese experts who are also occasionally hired as HR consultants by mining
companies. Conscious of gaps in their training and knowledge, several of my
informants told me about their plans to complete a master’s degree in HR man-
agement in South Africa or in Europe. In doing so, they hope to augment their
experience with a degree from an internationally recognized institution and
advance their careers – for instance, by gaining access to a HR position at a
multinational company’s headquarters. Finally, a group of HR managers took
the initiative to organize themselves by creating a WhatsApp group on which
they discuss about the problems they face in their day-to-day work.
This attraction to theoretical training, and more particularly to diploma courses,
suggests a common aspiration toward professionalization among HR managers. As
the subject matters of the training courses they complete indicate, their strategy for
professionalization is built on legal expertise and organizational development. It is
principally these two skills – along with a command of the English language – that
HR managers use to define their professional identity and rank each other. First, as
an expert in labour law who has worked as a consultant for several mining projects
explained to me, whether it is in the calculation of wages, job classification, or
dismissal procedures, all mining projects established in the copperbelt have made
legal errors, exposing foreign investors to serious legal, financial and/or social prob-
lems. The HR managers I interviewed blamed their predecessors’ amateurism for
such errors and, in order to highlight their own legal expertise, explained how they
resolved them. Second, the HR managers involved in implementing organizational
development plans also distinguish themselves from those managers whose functions
are limited to personnel administration (pay calculation, leave management, etc.) in
the tradition inherited from Gecamines. Building on their work experience in several
multinational companies, their command of English, and their international social
network, they were eager to demonstrate their knowledge of the latest fashion in
strategic HR management (flexible career development, extensive use of IT tools, the
promotion of workers’ participation, etc.).
Of course, the opportunity to develop these professional skills depends heavily
on the size of the company for which HR managers work. In small mines, and
large mining projects in the development phase, HR managers are usually
employed as multipurpose local assistants, who take in charge all the legal, admin-
istrative, and social aspects of personnel management. As these projects are often
autocratically managed by an expatriate general manager for whom personnel
management is often the least of his concerns, it is usually in these situations
that violations of the labour law (absence of work contracts, unfair dismissals,
refusal of unions, etc.) are most common. No matter how skillful HR managers
are: In the face of their boss’ decisions, they cannot do much except attempt to find
retroactive solutions to the problems they pose.
As mining projects develop, and begin to have a larger permanent staff, HR
managers have the opportunity to delegate specific tasks (recruitment, discipline,
industrial relations, etc.) to collaborators. Their own job increasingly consists of
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supervising these collaborators’ work and reporting to the project’s general man-
ager. Generally speaking, as medium-sized and large companies in the production
phase have put in place rules and procedures in compliance with the law, they have
much better organized HR management apparatus than smaller companies. Such
structures are nonetheless to a large extent still limited to bureaucratic procedures
similar to those used by Gecamines’ personnel department in the past. It is only
recently, following the decline of copper prices in 2011, that some multinational
companies have adopted new organizational development plans that follow a more
strategic approach to HR management. These plans are very similar from one
company to another: they aim to optimize the organizational chart, to standardize
rules and procedures, and to develop new IT management tools. On the other
hand, they are not very participative: Congolese workers have few opportunities
to get involved in the decision-making process and/or to be promoted to executive
positions. The logic behind the organizational innovations implemented in these
companies is still largely top-down, bureaucratic, and coercive, i.e. they are largely
based on control and discipline.
Most of my informants, who are already among the highest ranked, the most
influential, and the best paid Congolese managers, feel that they have reached the
ceiling. The only advancement opportunities open to them are to find employment
in a larger mining project, or move beyond the project level, at the headquarters of
a multinational company. Moreover, they are keenly aware of being in a precar-
ious position: for whatever reason, they told me, they could lose their job over-
night. Unsurprisingly, this situation was often contrasted with that of Gecamines
managers in the past, who had both strong job security, and various advancement
opportunities in the state enterprise’s large bureaucratic structure.
To cope with the uncertainty inherent to their job position, HR managers
develop various strategies. On a day-to-day basis, aware that the preservation of
their job depends on expatriate executives’ goodwill, they strive to maintain their
trust. As we have seen, some HR managers seek to make their future more secure
by following distance learning courses in a recognized foreign institution. They
hope that the degree that they will obtain from this institution will give them the
opportunity to get a better job in case they are dismissed. Finally, even though
their job is generally time-consuming, many HR managers have developed small
businesses on the side, that they manage at a distance: Peter took over his father’s
construction company; James buys real estate to rent; Steven has bought land to
farm; Patrick has created a security company with a South African associate; etc.
Given the insecurity Congolese people confront, “looking for money” by develop-
ing various parallel activities has become the only game in town, including among
those who earn high wages.
Trust
Since the pioneer studies of customary chiefs in colonial Africa (Fallers, 1955;
Gluckman et al., 1949; Kuper, 1970; Mair, 1936), the anthropological literature
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on brokers has highlighted the dilemma they face as they are confronted to con-
flicting expectations from external institutions and local communities.
Characteristic of brokerage in general, these conflicting responsibilities explain
why brokers are often suspected of taking advantage of the situation, and why
they are generally in a precarious position: their legitimacy to control access to
resources they do not have is quickly put into question from all sides. To maintain
their position, brokers must spend considerable energy to cultivate the trust of all
stakeholders. This trust-building work varies however according to the balance of
forces and the opportunities that the different parties can offer to brokers. In the
case of Congolese HR managers, who are employed by mining companies, the
most important is to get into expatriate executives’ good graces. As we will see in
the next section, this bias in favor of expatriate executives can have serious con-
sequences in their relationship with other Congolese workers.
As we have already seen, the position of HR manager, which foreigners are
forbidden from holding, is one of the highest positions Congolese workers have
access to in the mining sector. In most mining projects, HR managers report
directly to the general manager, have a seat on the board of the heads of depart-
ment, and occasionally participate in meetings with the majority joint venture
partner’s HR team at the headquarters. This does not mean, however, that they
are considered full members of the senior management team. First, as they run a
small department considered to be of minor importance, HR managers must often
struggle to have their voices heard in the company. For obvious reasons, the
project’s general manager gives priority to the needs of departments involved in
the production process. As a result, the heads of these departments tend to make
decisions about their staff (to impose their candidate during the recruitment pro-
cess, to transfer a worker from one service to another, or even to dismiss a worker,
etc.) independently, and to use the HR department as a mere execution service
responsible for formalizing their decisions. The power of the HR manager depends
closely on the prerogatives that the project’s general manager is willing to give him.
Second, HR managers are not part of the expatriate executive staff, who are
directly recruited by the majority joint venture partner’s head office. Consequently,
they have very limited power over the members of this higher caste, unless they
commit a serious offense against a Congolese worker, which is subject to disciplin-
ary action by the HR department. An unwritten rule stipulates that HR managers
are exclusively responsible for the national workforce from which they themselves
originate.
Finally, in some companies, the foreign joint venture partner appoints an expa-
triate Organizational Development Officer (ODO) who oversees the Congolese HR
manager’s work. The latter finds himself placed in a situation analogous to that of
the black personnel officer described by Burawoy (1972) during Zambianization in
the 1960s. It is the expatriate supervisor who reports to the project’s general man-
ager, who sits on the board of the heads of department, and who participates in
strategic meetings at the headquarters abroad. Although the Congolese HR man-
ager has the title of a (senior) manager, and receives a relatively high salary, his
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actual role is to a large extent reduced to legal advice and red tape. This is, of
course, a frustrating experience:
“The ODO does not have any experience”, a HR manager in this situation told me,
“You feel embarrassed when you talk to him, you must lower yourself to his level, and
when you give him ideas, he takes them and then presents them as if they were his own
ideas. This is very frustrating, you know. I’m the HR manager, but I’m not given any
real value. They don’t listen to me. They take me for a suspect person, who’ll give all
the information to workers, or to state authorities”
One of the reasons for this relative marginalization is that expatriate managers
make a separate social world, from which Congolese HR managers are to a large
extent excluded. The expatriates have a closer relationship with each other as they
come alone to the Congo, and share the same language and interests. Even when
they live together with Congolese workers on site, they tend to stick together after
working hours. For Steven, who lives in a camp with his family for ten years, this is
a “natural” situation:
“Racism is absolutely natural, it’s normal. When you’re with another white, you feel
part of the same world, and me too, when I’m with my black brothers, I feel com-
fortable. There are things that we can’t do together. Let me take the case of the camp
where I live: The South Africans, on week-ends, they are used to make braais [barbe-
cues], but me, my own culture, is to go cultivate my field. On both sides, there is a
different culture”
As this quotation suggests, far from castigating it as the remnants of a colonial
racism that no longer has a place in the Congo, the HR managers I met tended to
show leniency towards expatriates’ discrimination practices. They understood it as
the result of a difference of culture and/or of a comprehensible distrust of
Congolese people. The idea that the Congolese people are untrustworthy is,
indeed, widely shared in the Congolese copperbelt (xx, 2009). During a conversa-
tion in a fancy bar in Kolwezi, Daniel accordingly justified the dominance of
expatriates in the mining sector with the bankruptcy of Gecamines, which demon-
strated in his view the Congolese people’s failure to develop their country’s mining
potential:
“When they came here, they [foreign investors] found a country with all its riches.
Minerals are easy to take here. It is not like Chile, or Siberia, where the nature of the
soil causes serious problems for mining companies. So they came here and realized
that Congolese people haven’t been able to extract these resources, are unable to do it.
They inherited a large company like Gecamines from the colonizer, but it collapsed.
You understand? Trust disappears straightaway. If you give these people responsibil-
ities, you risk losing your investment. So, you have a strong lack of trust in the
national staff. This can be seen in the company in the lack of access to important
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positions. I’m of course among the Congolese workers in a high-ranking position, but
this is admittedly due to the fact that the law provides that the HR manager must be a
Congolese. For other positions, there is no such legal provision, and the company
prefers to appoint expats. It can’t take a local.”
According to sociologist K. Renner (1978[1953]; see Bouffartigue and Gadea,
2001; Goldthorpe, 1982, 1995), managers constitute a ‘service class’ whose
power in organizations depends on the employer’s trust in their capacity to
work in his/her best interests. In contrast to workers, who are hired for their
labour power, the employment relationship with managers is based on a code of
service, which involves an important degree of trust. Since trust is never given in
advance, managers must constantly show that they deserve it. In the case of mining
companies, the choice to hire expatriates for key positions is as much based on
trust as on professional proficiency. After all, they speak the same language, they
have a recognized degree, they know the same people, etc. Congolese HR manag-
ers, by contrast, are a priori subjected to suspicion: Are they able to do the job? Do
they draw personal profits from their position? Are they on the employer’s or the
workers’ side? If expatriate executives are generally willing to give them a chance,
the slightest mistake on their part will be sufficient to break the trust they have
placed in them and could lead to their disgrace.
The stories of HR managers’ careers in the mining sector can be read as a struggle
to gain expatriate executives’ trust and to legitimize their full membership in the
managerial class. During interviews, many managers explained in detail how they
obtained their job: they showed that they had the skills for the job by pointing out
weaknesses in the existing HRmanagement and proposing the necessary solutions to
improvement. They also drew attention to the concrete actions they had taken since
they held the position to formalize procedures and bring them into line with the law.
Cutting staff was presented as a particularly critical test of their capacity to take on
the role of HR manager. Those who had to organize mass layoffs following the
financial crisis of 2008, or the decline of copper prices in 2011-2016, stressed the
complex and sensitive nature of the course of action that they had to follow. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, my informants pointed to the importance of dem-
onstrating their loyalty to the company during union negotiations, by defending its
interests in the best possible way in the face of workers’ demands.
Showing loyalty to the company during union negotiations brings about two
difficulties. First, ex HR managers, who have at times themselves contributed
themselves to the introduction of unions in the company, do not hesitate to justify
their presence: union representation is required by the law; union’s approval is
compulsory to take certain internal organizational measures (the promulgation of
staff regulations, the adoption of a collective agreement, the creation of a health
and safety committee, etc.); and, last but not least, unions can be useful in pre-
venting work stoppages or strikes. But expatriate executives, they told me, have
trouble understanding that, far from being some hardline militant organization,
Congolese unions are the company’s “partners”, who can contribute to industrial
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peace. Since the colonial era, their role has been to “educate the working class”, an
expression by which my informants mean to sensitize unskilled workers to the
requirements of industrial work and to prevent the spread of false rumors
among them. In their view, it is when the HR department and its union partners
fail in fulfilling this mission that (uneducated) workers go on strike.
For HR managers, to allow the union delegation to achieve its educational role,
it is essential that union representatives be united and responsible. Competition
between them, and/or the presence of “extremists” among them are considered as
factors that increase the risk of wildcat strikes. In order to have a “good” union
delegation, HR managers do not hesitate in interfering with union elections, and
paying high attendance fees for union meetings. They also take care to show union
representatives respect and to meet at least some of their demands. As the HR
manager of a large company explained to me, contrary to what some expatriate
executives think, being rude to unions is not a good strategy: “The Congolese are
like donkeys, if they’re beaten, they take a stand and don’t move anymore”.
The second difficulty is that most expatriate managers do not understand what
is being said at the bargaining table because they do not speak French. It is the HR
managers who deal directly with union representatives on behalf of the employer,
and then report to their expatriate superiors. The problem here is that they also
benefit from the improvements obtained by the unions: “We are also employees,
and we have dependents”, one of them told me, “so if the company increases
school allowances, we will not be opposed to it”. In addition, contrary to expatri-
ates, HR managers know the expenses that workers face in their daily lives, and
thus find many of their demands to be rather reasonable.
All the HR managers I met nonetheless unanimously stressed that their role is to
defend their employer’s interests against those of unions and workers. Their job
demands it. Using a sports metaphor, they explained that, in the match opposing
the employer to the unions, they are “on the employer’s bench”. The fact that they
have the same background as the opposing team, and that they share their condi-
tion, should not prevent them from playing on the side of the visiting team without
cheating. As Steven explained:
“The general manager once told me: ‘you seem to be more union than employer. So it
had kind of upset me. It must be said: I’m already in the management team, I’m on
the employer’s team, I’m the employer, so I wish no one could tell me that I’m also a
unionist. Because many times, I have held the union meetings without the general
manager. You see, I’m conducting the meetings, I’m communicating to the unions,
I’m deciding on behalf of the employer. I understand very well the difficulties on the
union side because I share the same realities as all the other Congolese. But to say that
I’m in collusion with the unions because the employer is an expat, I don’t think so. If
that were the case, I would not understand my role. The truth is that I’m HR”
To demonstrate their skills and loyalty to the expatriate executives is not every-
thing. For HR managers to gain their trust and justify their presence in the
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managerial team, they must more broadly make a good impression on their expa-
triate bosses (see Gonzales, 1972). According to the folk sociology of the different
corporate cultures that HR managers have developed over the past decade, this
‘face work’– which requires specific social and cultural dispositions – depends on
whether they work with the “Anglo-Saxons” (a category including the
“Americans”, the “South Africans” and the “Australians”), the “Belgians” and
the “French”, or the “Chinese”. These nationalities are those of the project’s expa-
triate directors. It is not necessarily correlated with the country where the parent
company has its headquarters.
Take for instance the case of companies run by “Anglo-Saxon” executives. In
these companies, HR managers must show that they work hard by arriving early
and leaving late, and by being reachable at all times including outside working
hours. They must also understand the subtlety of the interaction codes that prevail
among this category of expatriates. The ability to speak English is of course essen-
tial, not on only as a medium for communication, but also as a sign of intelligence
(see Kalonji Wa Mpoyo, 2016). As a friend who worked as a consultant in several
multinational companies told me, “If you don’t speak English, the expats see you
as an idiot who is unable to think”. It is also appropriate to be assertive and jovial
with the Americans, the South-Africans and the Australians as they are perceived
as being less formal than the “Belgians” and the “French” who worked at
Gecamines in the past (see, on the etiquette prevailing in large American corpo-
rations, Jackall, 1983) [AQ3]. At the same time, Congolese HR managers quickly
learn that this apparent familiarity does not mean that they can afford to interrupt
their superiors, to give their opinion freely, or to take the lead in the conversation –
they are not an equal footing. Finally, as we will see below, some of my informants
consider prudent to distance themselves from the industrial paternalism of
Gecamines during exchanges with expatriates as a means to show that they are
favorable to the development of a new (“Anglo-Saxon”) corporate culture centered
on value creation (production, downsizing, outsourcing, participation, etc.).
HR managers’ command of the codes governing the interactions with expatri-
ates can be understood as a form of cosmopolitanism in Hannerz’s (1996: 102–111)
sense of the word. Of course, even though they occasionally travel abroad, they are
locals at heart in many ways. Their social and cultural life outside working hours
principally revolves around the family, the church, and their private businesses.
Only a few go to fancy bars and restaurants. In a way, however, HR managers are
more cosmopolitan than the expatriates working in the mining sector, who live in
secure compounds on site or in town without expending much effort to learn the
local languages, or to know more about Congolese culture. Indeed, they show two
characteristic features of Hannerz’s ‘cosmopolitan attitude’: a certain openness to
expatriates’ cultural differences, on the one hand, and a critical distance from
certain aspects of their own local culture, on the other. Far from reflecting a
general stance towards cultural difference, this cosmopolitan attitude must be
understood in the light of their job’s requirements, which have changed consider-
ably since the arrival of new foreign investors in the early 2000s.
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Mediations
Brokers are not vectors who merely implement programs of action designed else-
where. On the contrary, they contribute to shape these programs by translating the
interests of the different parties involved, mobilizing them around common goals,
and channeling the distribution of resources among them (Mosse and Lewis, 2006).
In other words, their agency makes a difference in the way programs of action are
put in place locally. The HR managers are no exception; they have been actively
involved in the changes that new mining investors brought in the domain of labour
in the Congolese copper mining sector.
The first thing that struck HR managers coming from Gecamines was the small
size of the new companies, especially the department that they had to run.
Gecamines’ personnel administration, which had more than 34,000 workers
under its supervision in the early 1990s, was a large bureaucracy with a head
office in Lubumbashi and decentralized services in the company’s various subdi-
visions. In comparison, with a permanent staff not exceeding 4,000 workers, the
HR departments of the new companies are very small. For example, while 30
people worked in the recruitment division at the Gecamines head office in the
past, this function is now performed by only one person. Although they oversee
a smaller team, HR managers in the new mining projects are directly involved in
the supervision of a larger number of functions or task domains. As John, who had
worked in the Gecamines administration in Kolwezi for a long time before starting
a career in various foreign companies, explained:
“Now, I feel more responsible. What does it mean? The former HR functions are still
there, but there are also other things that I was not doing in the past. (. . .). It’s a total
domain of responsibility that the company gives you, from the worker’s recruitment
to his departure. For instance, when I began to work at the Gecamines’ personnel
management office in Kolwezi, we were not responsible for recruiting workers.
Recruitment was managed from the Lubumbashi head office. For the payroll, we
were responsible for the time sheets and pay slips at the end of the month, but only
for the workers, not for the managers who were directly supervised from Lubumbashi.
With the new management here, the HR department is responsible for it all, from the
selection of workers to the calculation of bonuses and benefits, for both the workers
and the managers”.
If Gecamines workers like John left Gecamines, it is because the new mining
companies offered them a higher, more regularly paid, salary. Eroded by inflation,
the salaries of Gecamines workers were low and, from the late 1990s onwards, was
paid erratically. Up to the 1970s, they considered that this low wage to be com-
pensated for by the various benefits they received from the company (a house,
family food rations, free access to schools and hospitals, and so on). But after the
company sold its houses to the workers and began to cut in social expenditures,
these benefits lost much of their importance. In 2003, Gecamines workers had on
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average more than 36months of wage arrears and no substantial additional bene-
fits. Thus, workers, like Lester, who had the opportunity to get a job in a new
mining company did not hesitate to take the new opportunity: “What attracted me
here [in the company where he is currently employed] is that when you work here,
you receive a salary. You are given money to live decently, which is different from
Gecamines. When I was called for the interview, I asked: ‘How much do you want
to pay me?’. ‘That much’ [they answered]. ‘All right! I’m coming right now’”.
On the other hand, reluctant to reproduce Gecamines paternalism, most of the
new investors reduced the number of benefits workers were offered and converted
those that they continued to provide in cash. While this mode of remuneration (in
cash) might be preferred by workers, it has led to wages– especially among
unskilled workers – that are insufficient in covering all their expenses (rent,
school fees, etc.). In all mining companies, unions demand higher wages and do
not hesitate to use Gecamines model to do so. Drawing inspiration from the state-
owned enterprise’s collective agreement, they ask for an increase and/or an exten-
sion of the legal and extra-legal benefits included in the calculation of their wages
(distribution of sacks of maize flour, contributions to school fees, etc.). They also
propose the introduction of a rank and salary scale that workers could climb by
gaining in seniority or completing training. Currently, the only opportunity to rise
in the hierarchy and/or to benefit from a salary increase is to apply for higher
position internally or to take a job in another company.
Under these conditions, the expatriate management instructs HR managers to
explain to the unions that their demands are both disproportionate and obsolete.
As mining projects are still in the development phase, and pushed to demonstrate
their profitability to shareholders in the short term, they cannot afford to prioritize
the workers. More fundamentally, to meet their demands would lead to reproduc-
ing an outdated paternalistic model – a model that is at the root of Gecamines’
economic failure in the view of foreign investors. It is up to the unions to under-
stand that their duty is now to preserve jobs by explaining to workers that they
must get by with the wages they receive. In all circumstances priority must be given
to the company’s cost-effectiveness and to the creation of value.
The recruitment process in new mining companies is not very different from the
one in place at Gecamines since the late 1960s. The main difference is that recruit-
ment is not organized by a large bureaucratic machine, but by small teams under
the direct supervision of HR managers. The latter are, for this reason, under strong
social and political pressure. In a country where the number of higher education
graduates is constantly increasing, even though “proper” jobs remain extremely
scarce, mining companies receive a very large number of applications. Most of
these applications are accompanied by recommendations from moral or political
authorities to the HR manager personally (Kahola, 2015). For most Congolese
people, the HR manager is the foreign company’s “gate”. After all, it is to him that
application files must be sent, and his department is responsible for selecting the
candidates who will make it to the second step of the process, the tests and the
interview. Although he does not have the last word (it is the head of the recruiting
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department who makes the final choice), he has the power to put CVs on top of the
pile. As we have seen above, HR managers are also among the top-ranking
Congolese managers in the company. Unlike expatriates, their phone number is
easy to find, they speak French, and they are able to gauge the importance of the
candidate’s sponsors. Above all, they are used to recommendations as they are an
integral part of institutional life in the Congo.
The HR managers I encountered were indeed quite lenient with the constant
recommendations they received from all sides: relatives, neighbors, colleagues,
church members, friends from university, customary chiefs, political parties, and
various state authorities, from the local to the national level. These recommenda-
tions were made orally, by phone, or by letter. Faced with these multiple requests,
their strategy is always the same: they systematically answer that the recommended
candidate’s CV will be seriously taken into consideration and that the sponsor will
be informed of the application’s outcome. Even if they do not take recommenda-
tions into account, it is essential for HR managers to show their good will to their
interlocutor. If they were to explicitly ignore these recommendations, they would
unnecessarily expose themselves not only to criticism from their entourage, but
also to threats from powerful people.
This last risk is particularly important for HR managers who are not
“originaires” (autochthonous) of the territory or the province where the mine
site is located.3 Most mining companies established in remote rural areas adopt
local content policies within the framework of their CSR program – another inno-
vation in comparison to Gecamines policies in the past. For recruitment, HR
managers are expected to give priority to candidates from local communities
and to pay particular attention to recommendations from local power figures.
However, this rule is only followed for unskilled jobs, which are rather limited
when mining projects are in the production phase. Under these conditions, HR
managers who are “non-originaires” are swiftly accused of favoring those from
their fellow tribe/province to the detriment of local communities (see Geschiere
and Nyamnjoh, 2000). With the support of customary chiefs, local ethnic associ-
ations such as Sempya (Bemba) or Lwanzo lwa Mikuba (Sanga) do not hesitate to
send letters to the company, to protest and/or to ask state authorities’ support in
demanding the dismissal of the HR manager. Although these efforts rarely achieve
their goals, they lead mining companies to consider hiring a candidate from the
appropriate tribe or province when the HR manager position is left vacant in the
hope of avoiding unnecessary tension with local communities.
Finally, the new mining companies offer more precarious jobs than Gecamines.
In comparison to the state-owned enterprise, workers in these companies are more
readily dismissed for gross misconduct, and calls to a political patron to be rescued
from disciplinary action are less effective. Although the number of dismissals for
disciplinary reasons should not be overestimated, the number of punishable behav-
iors, the increased punishment for such behaviors, and the inflexible attitude of
management contribute to fueling workers’ sense of precariousness. In addition,
following the financial crisis in 2008, and then the decline of copper prices between
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2011 and 2016, several mining companies cut their workforces through mass lay-
offs, voluntary departure programs, or technical leave procedures. Justified by the
necessity to keep their finances – if not, their stock price – afloat, such practices
contrast the stability of employment Gecamines provided in the past. In the 1990s,
even while it was going into debt, it did not dismiss any worker.
As HR managers are responsible for prosecuting and dismissing the workers
guilty of misconduct as well as for preparing the list of those who will be impacted
by a mass lay-off, this new political economy of precarious employment has impor-
tant consequences for them. Following a logic similar to that observed for recruit-
ment, they are suspected to have discretion in these procedures, and they are
thereby subjected to multiple pressures from within and outside the company.
Those who fear losing their jobs do not hesitate to ask state authorities to exert
pressure on the HR manager and/or to directly threaten him. Such personal threats
have led some HR managers to take strong measures to protect themselves and
their families. Steven, who fears being attacked, no longer eats outside his house,
and only leaves the mining concession in the company of an armed policeman.
After some workers took their issues with the mining company out on his children,
Daniel decided to send them to school in South Africa, where they now live
together away from their parents. And Alistair, with whom I introduced this arti-
cle, moved his family to Zambia after receiving a threatening letter.
Several informants referenced the assault of the Air France HR manager in
2015, whose video had widely circulated on news channels, to suggest that their
job is by definition “unpopular” across the globe. The dialectics of requests and
threats progressively push them to avoid contact with colleagues and to limit their
social life outside work to their family and the church. If they go out, it is only in
fancy places frequented by the rich. As a result, they are often seen by workers as
cold, arrogant, men, who have broken with the social world from which they come.
In a sense, HR managers could be viewed as the counterpart of Simmel’s
(1950[1908]) “stranger”. Unlike the stranger, they are “organic” members of the
group “from the beginning”. At the same time, as they serve foreign interests,
they are caught in an “estrangement” process. By virtue of their duties, they are
progressively put at a distance from the group, and the relations with them
come to integrate an element of coolness, some skepticism about his attachment
to the group.
It is clear from the above that, even though their room for manoeuver varies
according to the size and the development phase of mining projects, Congolese HR
managers do not only endure organizational changes designed elsewhere. They
actively participate in their implementation at the project level: they justify the
employer’s decisions; they negotiate unions’ demands; they ensure that the com-
pany complies with the law; they maintain good relations with state authorities;
they intervene in the selection of job candidates; and so on. This work of transla-
tion and mediation between expatriate executives, trade unionists, state officials,
workers, etc., allows them to mobilize these various actors for the benefit of the
mining project despite their diverging interests. At the same time, it has negative
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consequences on the relations that HR managers have with their colleagues. While
expatriate executives suspect them of being on the side of workers, the workers
regard them as expatriate managers’ collaborators. As a result, they tend to be
isolated in the company, and when a crisis such as a strike or a mass lay-off occurs
they are very often deemed responsible for it.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to shed some light on the work of middle managers in
foreign mining companies established in the global South. Few studies in the
anthropology of mining deal with this category of employees, and the broader
social science literature on middle managers is essentially on well-established cor-
porations in the global North. It does not allow, therefore, to capture the specific
experience of the HR managers of this study, who work for foreign mining com-
panies developing new mining projects in Congo – a country of the global South.
Who are they? What difficulties do they face? What do they do to mining projects?
To answer these questions, this article proposed to study them as company brokers
and to build on the anthropological literature on brokerage to analyze various
aspects of their work.
Like the state and development brokers, HR managers act as intermediaries
between an external organization and various local stakeholders. To access their
position, and retain it, they acquired various organizational, legal, and cultural
skills through a process of learning by doing. This position grants them a certain
authority in Congolese society, as they are deemed to control access to jobs in
mining companies. However, as they are not part of the expatriate executive team,
their presence in this position is precarious: it depends to a large extent on their
ability to retain their superiors’ trust by demonstrating their skills, their loyalty
and their cosmopolitanism. Eager to show that they deserve this trust, Congolese
HR managers take an active part in the organizational changes that mining com-
panies put in place, and strive to serve their employers’ best interests. In this
respect, they can be regarded as the agents of their own society’s dependency on
global capitalism (Bayart, 1993, 2000).4 This extraversion strategy however comes
with a certain price. Deemed responsible for mining companies’ labour policies,
they can arouse resentment among the workers, who sometimes target them per-
sonally for retaliation.
The literature on brokers operating around mining projects can nevertheless be
criticized for reproducing the image of the mining corporation as an actor in itself.
By studying the everyday work of HR managers, this article provided an inside
view of how mining companies work and localize their operations. From this
perspective, mining projects are not merely negotiated from the outside, by local
brokers interacting with a monolithic corporation, but also from within, by var-
ious categories of workers – especially those who are responsible for representing
the company, coordinating its projects locally, dealing with state authorities, etc.
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Indeed, even though they often play a key role in the establishment of new
mining projects, HR managers are only company brokers among others, whose
responsibility is limited to labour-related issues. To understand how transnational
mining projects are negotiated locally in a more comprehensive way, the scope of
the analysis sketched above would need to be extended to other categories of
middle managers. In doing so, the aim is to open the black box of mining com-
panies so as to better understand how mining capitalism is generated out of the
work practices, the social networks, and the ethical projects of the mine employees
who play a strategic role at the project level (see Bear, 2015; Bear et al., 2015;
Tsing, 2015). Far from being an external abstract force that is instrumentalized,
resisted, or supported by leaders in the local political arena, mining projects are
continuously co-produced by various local actors within and outside companies,
and this from the very first step investors take in the country. [AQ1]
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Notes
1. To anonymize informants, all the names in this article are pseudonyms.
2. HR managers are characterized as company brokers to underscore the fact that they
perform various tasks (they recruit workers, negotiate with trade unions, organize mass
layoffs, etc.) on behalf of foreign mining companies. As such, they differ from the labour
brokers who operate on the labour market outside mining companies. The use of this
term has to be understood more broadly in view of the main argument of the article, i.e.
that middle managers play a key role in the localization of foreign companies, and hence
in the development of capitalism in the global South.
3. On the historical significance of autochthony in the former Katanga province (see
Bakajika, 1997; Dibwe Dia Mwembu, 2006; Gobbers, 2016).
4. Bayart (1993, 2000) proposes to study dependency not as a structure imposed by foreign
powers, but as a process in which local power figures take an active part. His work
stresses the significance of such extraversion practices in power strategies in Africa.
The role of the HR managers of this study can thus be viewed as part of a broader
repertoire of cultural practices that has a long history on the continent.
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